























                                                
1 Frankly, when we’re not being stuffy about it, the reason most of us are in philosophy 
has little to do with its intrinsic value and much more to do with the fact that it is fun (or so I 





                                                
2 Richard Popkin argues that the labor of historians is necessary for contemporary 
philosophy in a practical sense. Popkin argues that without historians of philosophy, 
contemporary philosophers would not be able fully to appraise the philosophical systems of these 
figures. He says, “For anyone who wants to understand [Wittgenstein] there are hosts of 
historical and philological problems. The most rudimentary are linguistic. How can one tell if 
one is reading what Wittgenstein wrote unless one knows German, knows something about the 
peculiarities of Viennese German, etc.?” (Popkin 1985, 628). In light of these considerations 
Popkin asks, “can one say that history of philosophy is unneeded, or irrelevant?  … If not, then 
the historian plays a role … in making the doing of philosophy at any given time and place in 
history, possible” (631). So history of philosophy is necessary in a pragmatic sense.  
If there are philosophers who refuse to see the need for the labor Popkin describes, they 
are arrogantly incorrect. Playing to the home crowd Popkin motivates his project by appeal to 
“dreary discussions” he’s had the misfortune of being party to during the “thirty-nine and one-
half years that [he has] been teaching in Philosophy departments” (626). He thus fails to pin such 
a view on anyone, and it is no wonder why. By anecdotally attacking a straw man he 





































                                                
3 Even this is not quite right. Many of Descartes’ letters and some of his treatises have no 





                                                
4 Sellars claimed that the history of philosophy is necessary to contemporary philosophy 
because it provides contemporary philosophy with a lingua franca. This marks a plausible way 
to unpack vaunted claims about the ‘essentially historical’ nature of philosophy. I suspect he is 
correct; history of philosophy continuously sets the table for problem-solving philosophy. This, 
however, does not imply that studying history of philosophy the way it is often studied is 
instrumentally valuable to contemporary philosophy, let alone intrinsically valuable. In fact, once 
this common language is in place, one might argue that attempts by historians to rewrite the 







                                                











                                                
6 Elsewhere (in a letter to Hogelande, August 1638) Descartes criticizes a doxographic 
history of philosophy text by saying, “I do not mean that one should neglect other people’s 
discoveries when one encounters useful ones; but I do not think one should spend the greater part 
of one’s time in collecting them. If a man were capable of finding the foundations of the 
sciences, he would be wrong to waste his life in finding scraps of knowledge hidden in the 
corners of libraries; and if he were no good for anything else but that, he would not be capable of 









                                                
7 I’ve plugged this gap myself in Nichols 1999 by arguing that Leibniz evades Strawson’s 







































                                                
8 I thank George Pappas and Glenn Hartz for conversations about this matter. I’m also 
grateful to the participants at a Graduate Student Colloquium at Ohio State, including Cathal 
Woods, Bill Melanson, Rick Groshong and David Merli, where an earlier version of this paper 
was presented. 
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